

Supplementary Appendix for:

Ronald R. Krebs and Roy Licklider, "United They Fall: Why the International Community Should Not Promote Military Integration After Civil War," *International Security* 40:3 (winter 2015/2016).

This supplementary appendix presents the data comparing our 11 cases of post-civil war military integration with the larger universe of cases. We draw this larger set from Caroline Hartzell's compendium of civil war settlements between 1945 and 2006 that included military integration provisions.¹ We thus compare our 11 cases to an additional 34, listed in Appendix A, Table 1 (below).² The data in Table 1 come largely from Hartzell, supplemented with military force data from Professor Reed Wood,³ the *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers* series,⁴ and the National Material Capabilities Dataset (of the Correlates of War project),⁵ and with some GDP data from Kristian Gleditsch.⁶ We are grateful to our colleagues for sharing this data and to Jennifer Spindel for her assistance in collecting and analyzing this data.

As we note in the article, however, we cannot make strong claims regarding the similarities and differences between our cases and the larger universe because the quantitative literature on civil war is so contradictory, so sensitive to small changes in the specification of the key variables, and based on such poor data.⁷

Appendix A, Table 2 (below) presents some summary data on key factors, along with the difference, recorded in percentage terms, between our 11 cases and the other 34 civil wars. Presumably due to the relatively small number of cases, difference-of-means tests indicate that the differences between our 11 cases and the other 34 are generally not statistically significant. The exceptions include the number of rebel troops at war's end, which is statistically different from zero but weakly so, at the 0.08 level, and battle deaths, which is more strongly significant, at the 0.03 level. These difference-of-means tests are recorded in Appendix B.

¹ Caroline A. Hartzell, "Mixed Motives? Explaining the Decision to Integrate Militaries at Civil War's End," in Roy Licklider, ed., *New Armies from Old: Merging Competing Military Forces after Civil Wars* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014), pp. 13-27.

² Our total count differs slightly from Hartzell's because, for the purposes of the qualitative analysis, we combined what Hartzell lists as two distinct civil wars in Burundi and two distinct civil wars in Rwanda as actually a single, longer civil war in each nation respectively. Thus our case of Burundi is equivalent to the fourth and fifth civil wars in that nation in Hartzell's dataset, and our case of Rwanda is equivalent to the second and third civil wars in that nation in Hartzell's dataset.

³ Reed M. Wood, "Opportunities to Kill or Incentives for Restraint? Rebel Capabilities, the Origins of Support, and Civilian Victimization in Civil War," *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, Vol. 31, No. 5 (November 2014), pp. 461-480. To generate his data, Wood draws from the UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia, available at <http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/search.php>.

⁴ Available at <http://www.state.gov/t/avc/rls/rpt/wmeat/>.

⁵ Available at <http://cow.dss.ucdavis.edu/data-sets/national-material-capabilities>.

⁶ Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, "Expanded Trade and GDP Data," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 46, No. 5 (October 2002), pp. 712-724.

⁷ For general discussion of these issues in the literature, see Nicholas Sambanis, "What Is Civil War? Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 48, No. 6 (2004), pp. 814-858; Håvard Hegre and Nicholas Sambanis, "Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on Civil War Onset," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2006), pp. 508-535; Charles T. Call, *When Peace Fails: The Causes and Prevention of Civil War Recurrence* (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2012), pp. 65-66.

Appendix A, Table 1

Cases in Krebs and Licklider, "United They Fall"

case	Ccode	End	Battle-related deaths	In (battle-related deaths)	Intensity (battle-related deaths/duration)	Duration (months)	No. of Rebel Groups	Total Population (thousands, year prior to war)	Peacekeeping Mission?	GDP/capita, at war's end	Rebel Troops, at war's end	Gov't troops, at war's end	Rebel troops, at war's end, per capita	Gov't troops, at war's end, per capita	Ratio, Rebel to Gov't Forces, at War's End
Bosnia	346	11/1/95	263000	12.47991	6152.05	42.75	4	4409	1	2266.05	65,000	97333	0.01474	0.02208	0.66781
Burundi (4&5)	516	10/8/03	153500	11.91839	1223.11	125.5	3	5786	1	375.14	21,500	49667	0.00372	0.00858	0.43288
Democratic Republic Congo (5)	490	8/31/99	75000	11.22524339	6250.00	12	4	14106	1	177.76	42,000	84133	0.00298	0.00596	0.49921
Lebanon (2)	660	10/13/90	163000	12.00151	934.10	174.5	11	2737	1	8693.25	15,000	36000	0.00548	0.01315	0.41667
Mozambique	541	10/4/92	122000	11.71178	983.87	124	2	12453	1	370.02	20,000	50000	0.00161	0.00402	0.40000
Philippines (2)	840	9/2/96	120000	11.69525	418.12	287	2	37862	0	2117.9	12,000	118667	0.00032	0.00313	0.10112
Rwanda (2&3)	517	7/19/94	805500	13.59921848	21337.75	37.75	2	7007	1	391.74	12,000	30000	0.00171	0.00428	0.40000
Sierre Leone (2)	451	7/7/99	10500	9.25913	411.76	25.5	4	4297	1	508.93	15,000	3600	0.00349	0.00084	4.16667
South Africa	560	5/10/94	16000	9.680344	123.71	129.33	3	30686	1	5232.72	42,000	80000	0.00137	0.00261	0.52500
Sudan1	625	2/28/72	501000	13.12436	4960.40	101	3	11616	0	1364.11	11,000	35000	0.00095	0.00301	0.31429
Zimbabwe	552	12/28/79	12000	9.392662	142.86	84	5	5550	1	225	20,000	38000	0.00360	0.00685	0.52632
MEAN			203772.73	11.46	3903.43	103.94	3.91	12409.91	0.82	1974.78	25045.45	56581.82	0.00	0.01	0.77
Standard Deviation			244498.3	1.46	6268.39	79.46	2.55	11527.61		2689.054	17,246	34150	0.00398	0.00610	1.13613
MEDIAN			122000	11.71	983.87	101	3	7007	1	508.93	20000	49667	0.00298	0.00428	0.43288

Appendix A, Table 2

	Cases in “United They Fall”	Other Cases of Military Integration After Civil War	All Military Integration Cases	Percent Difference (“United They Fall” vs. Other Cases)
War duration (months)	103.9	82.3	87.6	26.25%
Battle-related deaths	203,772.7	99,573.5	125,623.3	104.7%
Intensity (battle-related deaths/duration)	3,903.4	1,075.3	1,782.3	263%
Rebel Groups (number)	3.9	3.7	3.7	5.4%
Population (thousands)	12,409.9	13,397.8	13,156.3	-7.3%
Peacekeeping missions (% of cases)	82%	50%	57%	64%
GDP/capita, at war’s end	1,974.7	1,714.9	1,778.4	15.2%
Rebel troops, at war’s end	25,045.4	13,875	17,838.7	80.5%
Government troops, at war’s end	56,581.8	100,468.8	89,241.9	-43.7%
Rebel troops, at war’s end, per capita	0.0036	0.0027	0.003	31.4%
Government troops, at war’s end, per capita	0.0068	0.0082	0.0078	-16.7%

Appendix B. Difference-of-Means Tests

WAR DURATION

ttest wardur, by(kl)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	34	82.33088	18.50668	107.9116	44.67875	119.983
1	11	103.9391	23.9581	79.46002	50.55713	157.3211
combined	45	87.61289	15.09735	101.2761	57.18617	118.0396
diff		-21.60821	35.38298		-92.96478	49.74837
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)					t = -0.6107	
Ho: diff = 0					degrees of freedom = 43	
Ha: diff < 0		Ha: diff != 0		Ha: diff > 0		
Pr(T < t) = 0.2723		Pr(T > t) = 0.5446		Pr(T > t) = 0.7277		

BATTLE DEATHS (unequal variance)

. ttest casualties, by(kl) unequal

Two-sample t test with unequal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	33	1075.265	284.3929	1633.713	495.9752	1654.554
1	11	3903.429	1889.991	6268.393	-307.7342	8114.593
combined	44	1782.306	536.3744	3557.906	700.6036	2864.008
diff		-2828.165	1911.268		-7061.68	1405.351
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)					t = -1.4797	
Ho: diff = 0					Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom = 10.4563	
Ha: diff < 0		Ha: diff != 0		Ha: diff > 0		
Pr(T < t) = 0.0842		Pr(T > t) = 0.1684		Pr(T > t) = 0.9158		

REBEL FACTIONS

. ttest rebfac, by(kl)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	34	3.705882	.2910716	1.697224	3.113693	4.298072
1	11	3.909091	.7681684	2.547726	2.197505	5.620677
combined	45	3.755556	.2845439	1.908778	3.182095	4.329016
diff		-.2032086	.6690409		-1.552458	1.146041
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)					t = -0.3037	
Ho: diff = 0					degrees of freedom = 43	
Ha: diff < 0		Ha: diff != 0		Ha: diff > 0		
Pr(T < t) = 0.3814		Pr(T > t) = 0.7628		Pr(T > t) = 0.6186		

TOTAL POPULATION

. ttest tpop, by(kl)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	34	13397.85	4407.645	25700.77	4430.431	22365.28
1	11	12409.91	3475.706	11527.61	4665.554	20154.26
combined	45	13156.36	3418.196	22929.95	6267.435	20045.28
diff		987.9439	8044.325		-15234.98	17210.87
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)				t =	0.1228	
Ho: diff = 0				degrees of freedom =	43	
Ha: diff < 0		Ha: diff != 0		Ha: diff > 0		
Pr(T < t) = 0.5486		Pr(T > t) = 0.9028		Pr(T > t) = 0.4514		

GDP PER CAPITA (unequal variance)

. ttest gdppc, by(kl) unequal

Two-sample t test with unequal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	34	1714.922	281.4165	1640.926	1142.376	2287.468
1	11	1974.784	810.7802	2689.054	168.2528	3781.315
combined	45	1778.444	285.7989	1917.197	1202.454	2354.434
diff		-259.8616	858.2306		-2121.529	1601.806
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)				t =	-0.3028	
Ho: diff = 0				Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom =	12.4996	
Ha: diff < 0		Ha: diff != 0		Ha: diff > 0		
Pr(T < t) = 0.3835		Pr(T > t) = 0.7670		Pr(T > t) = 0.6165		

REBEL TROOPS AT WAR'S END

. ttest rebtroopwarend, by(kl)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]	
0	20	13875	3550.922	15880.21	6442.835	21307.16
1	11	25045.45	5199.849	17245.95	13459.47	36631.44
combined	31	17838.71	3049.977	16981.55	11609.83	24067.59
diff		-11170.45	6142.707		-23733.7	1392.793
diff = mean(0) - mean(1)				t =	-1.8185	
Ho: diff = 0				degrees of freedom =	29	
Ha: diff < 0		Ha: diff != 0		Ha: diff > 0		
Pr(T < t) = 0.0397		Pr(T > t) = 0.0793		Pr(T > t) = 0.9603		

